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Abstract
A recently proposed authenticated key agreement protocol is shown to be
insecure. In particular, one of the two parties is not authenticated, allowing
an active ‘man in the middle’ opponent to replay old messages. The protocol
is essentially an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, and the
lack of authentication allows an attacker to replay ‘old’ messages and have
them accepted. Moreover, if the ephemeral key used to compute a protocol
message is ever compromised, then the key established using the replayed
message will also be compromised. Fixing the problem is simple — there are
many provably secure and standardised protocols which are just as efficient
as the flawed scheme.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Saeed et al. [3] proposed an authenticated key agreement
(AKA) protocol, based on an El Gamal-type identity-based signature scheme
and Diffie-Hellman key agreement in an elliptic curve setting. The scheme
is intended for use in the Internet of Things (IoT), but there appears to be
little about the protocol that makes it uniquely suitable for this domain.
In this brief paper we first outline the protocol and then demonstrate that it
fails to achieve authentication of either party. That is, an active attacker can
successfully impersonate either party in the protocol at any time, as long
as the attacker first successfully intercepts the messages sent in one gen-
uine instance of the protocol. Moreover, if an ephemeral key ever becomes
available to an attacker, then the attacker can perform the protocol with a
genuine party and convince that party to use a session key known to the
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attacker. These observations break (at least) two of the claimed properties
of the protocol.
2 Outline of the AKA protocol
As outlined in Section 1, the Saeed et al. protocol [3] is claimed to pro-
vide ‘authenticated key agreement’; it seems reasonable to assume that this,
amongst other things, captures the notion that both parties are given assur-
ance that the other party is involved in the protocol, i.e. that both parties
are ‘live’. However, it is hard to identify any part of the security model and
security definition which captures this notion; this is rather surprising, and
the authors appear to have departed from the usual security notions for such
protocols. Perhaps not surprisingly, as we discuss below, the protocol fails
to achieve proof of liveness.
The authors claim a list of security properties for the protocol — however,
these properties are not all supported by the claimed security proof in the
paper’. Two of these properties are as follows.
• P4: Key compromise impersonate;
• P5: Replay attack.
As we discuss below, neither of these properties hold for the protocol. That
is, we show that the protocol fails to achieve two properties specifically
claimed for it.
The protocol involves two messages exchanged between a server and a client
(referred to in [3] as a ‘sensor node’). The server sends a message to the
client and receives a response in return. The two messages have exactly
the same structure and content types, and the second message appears to
be completely independent of the first. That is, it would appear that they
could be exchanged in either order or, indeed, in parallel.
All cryptographic computations involve a pre-agreed elliptic curve C defined
over a finite field F, together with a pre-agreed point P on this curve that
generates a cyclic (additive) group G on the points of the curve. The system
uses identity-based signatures, and thus there is a universally trusted private
key generator (PKG) who has a master private/pubic key pair (sPKG, SPKG),
where sPKG is an integer (0 < sPKG < q) and SPKG = sPKGP . Every entity
who participates in the protocol (client or server) is assumed to have a well-
defined identifier ID, and is pre-equipped by the PKG with a long-term
private/public key pair (s, R), where R = rP for a randomly chosen integer
r; s = (r + csPKG)P mod q; and c = H1(ID||R) for a suitable hash function
H1. Since sPKG is known only to the PKG, only the PKG can generate key
pairs.
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Before constructing a protocol message, the sender generates two ephemeral
(one-time) values X and Y . The ephemeral public key Y is simply a scalar
multiple yP of the point P , where the integer y (0 < y < q) is a randomly
chosen ephemeral private key. Similarly, the value X is a scalar multiple xP
of the point P , where the integer x (0 < y < q) is also randomly chosen by
the sender (x and X form part of signature generation/verification).
The first message, i.e. that sent from the server to the client, has the follow-
ing form:
ID||Y ||σ||t
where ID is an identifier for the sender (in this case the server), Y is an
ephemeral public key created by the sender, σ is a type of El Gamal sig-
nature, t is a (fresh) timestamp created by the sender, and, as throughout,
|| denotes concatenation of data items (possibly incorporating encoding to
ensure unambiguous decoding by the recipient). The second message is
identical to the first except that in each case the sender is the client.
The signature σ is a triple (h, µ, R), computed as follows.
• h = H2(ID|ID
′||Y ||R||X), where H2 is an appropriate hash function,
ID is the identifier of the sender, ID′ is the identifier of the intended
recipient, Y is the ephemeral public key of the sender, R is the long-
term public key of the sender, and X is an ephemeral value generated
by the sender — see above);
• µ = x + hs, where x is an ephemeral value generated by the sender
and s is the long-term private key of the sender; and
• R is the long-term public key of the sender.
The message recipient (the client, although exactly the same process ap-
plies for the client-server message) performs the following steps to verify the
message and establish a shared secret session key.
1. The freshness of the timestamp t in the message is checked.
2. Compute c = H1(ID||R), where ID and R are the values in the received
message, and
h∗ = H2(ID||ID
′||Y ||R||µP − h(R + cPPKG)),
where ID is the identifier in the message, ID′ is the recipient’s own
identifier, and Y , R, µ and h are the values in the message, and check
that h = h∗;
3. Derive the shared secret key by hashing together the identifiers of the
two parties (always server ID first) and the scalar multiple y′Y , where
y′ is the recipient’s own ephemeral private key.
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3 A simple message replay attack
It should be clear that the timestamp t in the message is not verifiable in
any way, that is it is not incorporated into any of the cryptographically
computed parts of the message. It could hence be modified by a man-in-
the-middle attacker without this change being detectable by the message
recipient. This immediately suggests the following simple attack.
Suppose the attacker intercepts a message sent from the server to the client.
At any subsequent time the attacker can replay this message to the client and
it will be accepted as valid, as long as the attacker updates the timestamp t
before replaying the message. This immediately breaks claimed property P5
(Replay attack resistance) of the protocol. Note that a precisely analogous
attack enables impersonation of the client to the server.
Also, if the attacker compromises the ephemeral key y corresponding to the
intercepted message sent from server to client, then the attacker can not only
impersonate the server at will, but can also calculate the session key for this
spurious session, since the only non-public input to the key calculation is
the ephemeral private key. This shows that property P4 (Key compromise
impersonation resistance) also does not hold, contrary to what is claimed.
4 Implications
4.1 Fixing the problem
Of course, it would be relatively simple to fix the problem identified in this
short paper by including the value of the timestamp t within the scope of
hash function H2, ensuring that the signature σ is a function of the times-
tamp. However, recommending such an ad hoc fix without more carefully
analysing the protocol would be unwise.
Moreover, this is an area in which there has been a great deal of research over
the last 20–30 years. There are plenty of provably secure protocols (including
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes) which could be used
for the task addressed in this paper. In particular, the reader is referred
to ISO/IEC 11770-3 [2], which contains a wide variety of authenticated key
agreement protocols, all of which have been carefully checked and validated.
Also relevant is the book of Boyd and Mathuria [1] (and the new version
to be published in late 2019), which describes a very wide variety of such
protocols.
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4.2 Other remarks
There are a number of other serious issues with this paper, including the
following.
• Section 4.1 of the paper [3] contains a proof of security. The fact that
there are serious shortcomings in the protocol is therefore somewhat
surprising. However, as we have briefly observed above, the security
model underlying the security result does not capture important prop-
erties. In addition, on inspection, the proof of the main theorem lacks
rigour, which means that there must be doubts about whether the
theorem is true.
• There are many problems with the exposition. For example, there is
confusion between the size of the underlying finite field and the number
of points on the elliptic curve — q is used for both quantities.
• Finally, although designed for lightweight sensors, the protocol re-
quires all parties to have securely synchronised clocks and also the
ability to generate high quality random numbers. These are poten-
tially unrealistic requirements for very lightweight devices.
References
[1] C. A. Boyd and A. Mathuria. Protocols for key establishment and au-
thentication. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[2] International Organization for Standardization, Gene`ve, Switzerland.
ISO/IEC 11770-3:2015, Information technology — Security techniques
— Key management — Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric tech-
niques, 3rd edition, August 2015.
[3] M. E. S. Saeed, Q.-Y. Liu, G. Y. Tian, B. Gao, and F. Li. AKAIoTs:
authenticated key agreement for Internet of Things. Wireless Networks,
25:3081–3101, 2019.
5
